The Room Is Being Rearranged
Everyone is asking who will replace USAID. We should be asking what kind of institutions can operate in what comes next.

For most of the development sector’s professional life, we knew roughly where everybody sat.
Washington occupied a very large chair. Brussels had another. The World Bank and IMF sat at the serious end of the table. Foundations moved around its edges, while NGOs became remarkably good at learning the language required to secure an invitation.
Africa, more often than not, arrived with a proposal.
That room is now being rearranged. Not through a single grand redesign, and certainly not because a new global order was announced at a summit somewhere. It is happening through dozens of smaller shifts in the institutions, currencies, guarantees, payment systems and political relationships through which development capital moves.
The instinctive response to the retreat of USAID has been to ask who will fill the gap. Europe is an obvious candidate. China is another. Gulf capital, philanthropy and the BRICS institutions all enter the conversation.
But nine months into this disruption, that increasingly looks like the wrong question.
Nobody is replacing USAID. What is emerging around the space it occupied is a more fragmented system of capital, with different actors bringing different interests, instruments and rules. For Africa, that distinction is important.
Delhi gives us a glimpse
When BRICS leaders met in New Delhi last week, the predictable conversation returned to de-dollarisation and the long-rumoured BRICS currency.
The New Delhi Declaration advanced work on interoperability between payment and messaging systems across BRICS countries, continued efforts to enable settlement of trade and investment in members’ own currencies, progressed a BRICS Multilateral Guarantees initiative intended to reduce financing risk and mobilise private capital, and called on the New Development Bank to expand local-currency financing and diversify its sources of funding.
Read separately, these are technical adjustments to financial machinery. Read together, they reveal something more consequential.
BRICS is slowly working its way down the financial stack.
The questions are now in what currency does captial move, through whose infrastructure, under whose rules, with whose guarantee and carrying whose risk.
This is less dramatic than announcing a new currency. It is also considerably more plausible.
A common BRICS currency would require countries with profoundly different monetary systems and strategic interests to surrender degrees of control they have shown little inclination to surrender. Building connections between existing systems allows those same countries to create alternatives without first having to agree on everything else.
BRICS does not need to overthrow the dollar for this to become significant. If two countries can increasingly trade, finance infrastructure or settle transactions without routing every exchange through the same institutions and currencies they relied upon twenty years ago, the structure of their choices has already changed.
There are tensions inside this project, of course. India has little interest in replacing dependence on Western financial infrastructure with dependence on Chinese infrastructure. Brazil, Russia, South Africa, the UAE and the newer BRICS members arrive with their own interests. Multipolarity is not another word for harmony.
Brussels is moving too
Look west and a different part of the same transition is visible.
The retreat of USAID has created real financing gaps across health, food security, education, humanitarian assistance and civil society. These are not abstract geopolitical adjustments. Organisations have closed programmes, contracts have disappeared and people who relied on services have discovered very quickly that international relations eventually arrive at the clinic door.
Europe has begun responding, but it would be a mistake to imagine Brussels simply sliding into Washington's empty chair.
The European development proposition was already changing.
Global Gateway brings together development policy with infrastructure, energy, digital connectivity, trade, supply chains and European strategic interests. Its toolkit includes grants, concessional finance, guarantees, development-bank capital and private investment.
This represents a different conception of what development finance can be used to do.
The distinction becomes clearer when Europe talks openly about leverage and influence alongside development outcomes. There is nothing particularly scandalous about this. Development finance has never existed outside national interest, however politely the brochures were written.
Europe needs secure supply chains, critical minerals, energy partnerships, markets and geopolitical relationships. African countries need infrastructure, productive capacity, technology, employment and capital. Those interests can collide, but they can also overlap.
The quality of the outcome depends considerably on who has the capability to structure that overlap.
And that is where this becomes an African institutional question rather than simply a geopolitical one.
The new room has several doors
It is tempting to describe all of this as the decline of the West and the rise of BRICS. It makes for a satisfying headline because it gives history a clean direction.
The United States remains enormously powerful. The dollar remains dominant. Europe is not abandoning development assistance. China is both competitor and trading partner to many of the countries supposedly choosing between geopolitical camps. Gulf capital increasingly appears alongside all of them.
African governments will almost certainly continue dealing with everybody.
A renewable-energy project might involve European blended finance, Chinese technology, a South African bank, domestic pension capital, a multilateral guarantee and government procurement. Another project might combine philanthropy, corporate investment, carbon revenues and development-finance capital.
That is not hypothetical complexity. It is increasingly the environment in which development gets financed.
The emerging system is therefore less interesting because it is multipolar than because it is multi-instrument. That changes what development capability looks like.
Africa has seen this movie before
We should be careful not to romanticise any of this.
Africa could move from a Western-dominated development system into a more diverse global capital system and still reproduce precisely the same dependency.
New lenders do not automatically produce better projects. Local-currency financing does not guarantee local ownership. A European green investment can extract African resources while leaving remarkably little productive capability behind. Chinese infrastructure can solve a genuine constraint while creating another somewhere else. Gulf investment can be patient or predatory depending on the transaction.
The nationality of capital tells us surprisingly little about the quality of the development outcome.
What becomes more useful is to examine the architecture around it: who owns the resulting asset, where risk sits, who captures the return, what capabilities are transferred, where intellectual property resides, what happens when concessional capital exits, and whether communities participate in the value created rather than merely appearing in the impact report.
Above all, we should ask who structured the transaction. Because this is where Africa's opportunity, and vulnerability, begins to emerge.
The shift to capital assembly
Much of the African development sector has spent the past thirty years becoming exceptionally competent at fundraising.
We have donor databases, proposal teams, theories of change, monitoring frameworks and entire organisational structures built around identifying somebody else's funding window and making our work legible within it.
That capability will not disappear. Grants will continue to exist and some problems should absolutely be funded by grants. fundraising assumes that the central problem is finding somebody willing to fund the work.
Capital assembly starts somewhere else.
It asks what the problem requires and then identifies which forms of capital are appropriate to which parts of the solution.
A grant may fund early experimentation where commercial capital cannot reasonably take the risk. Government may procure a service once its value has been demonstrated. A development-finance institution may finance infrastructure. A guarantee may make a transaction investable. Corporate capital may have a strategic reason to participate. Carbon or other environmental value may create an additional revenue stream. Community ownership may need to be deliberately designed into the asset rather than promised somewhere downstream.
None of those instruments, on its own, is the answer. The capability is in assembling them.
That requires institutions that can understand a social problem and a balance sheet at the same time. Institutions that can speak to a foundation, a corporate, a DFI, government and an investor without pretending that each has the same mandate. Institutions capable of identifying where interests genuinely overlap and, equally importantly, where they do not.
This is a very different skill from writing a better funding proposal.
And we suspect it will become one of the defining development capabilities of the next decade.
The USAID question is therefore too small
When a major donor disappears, looking for another donor is understandable. Organisations have salaries to pay and programmes to keep alive. But at system level, replacing USAID cannot be the ambition.
The more interesting opportunity created by a fragmented global capital system is that African institutions may no longer need to organise themselves around a single dominant source of development finance.
More pools of capital can create negotiating space. More development banks can create competition. More financial instruments can allow risk to be allocated differently. More payment infrastructure can reduce dependence on particular routes. More geopolitical interests can create leverage.
None of that leverage exists automatically. It exists only if we as African institutions know how to assemble it.
Otherwise we will spend the next decade celebrating multipolarity while continuing to arrive at other people's tables carrying proposals.
That would be a spectacularly African development-sector achievement: changing the entire global financial architecture while somehow preserving our own dependency within it.
The interesting thing about Delhi last week was therefore not that BRICS unveiled a new world order. It didn't.
Nor is Europe simply occupying the space America is leaving behind.
Something less orderly, and potentially more useful, is happening. The sources of capital are multiplying. The instruments are becoming more varied. The infrastructure through which value moves is becoming contested. Development finance is becoming more explicitly entangled with trade, investment, industrial strategy and geopolitics.
The room is being rearranged.
For African institutions, the response cannot simply be to become better at finding the next source of funding. We need to become better at understanding different forms of capital, connecting them, and structuring them around the outcomes we actually want.
That is increasingly where GrowZA is positioning itself. Not simply between funders and projects, but at the point where capital, institutional interest and development outcomes have to be assembled into something that can actually work.
Because in the next development economy, knowing where the money is will be useful.
Knowing how to put it together will be considerably more valuable.


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